Vendor managed inventory (VMI) replenishment is a collaboration between a supplier and its customers where the supplier is responsible for managing the customers' inventory levels. In the VMI setting we consider, the supplier exploits synergies between customers, e.g., their locations, usage rates, and storage capacities, to reduce distribution costs. Due to the intricate interactions between customers, calculating a fair cost-to-serve for each customer is a daunting task. However, cost-to-serve information is useful when marketing to new customers, or when revisiting routing and delivery quantity decisions. We design mechanisms for this cost allocation problem and determine their characteristics both analytically and computationally.
Introduction
Vendor managed inventory (VMI) is a coordinated effort between a supplier and its customers to increase the efficiency of a supply chain. In a conventional inventory management setting, each customer monitors its own inventory level and places orders with the supplier, thus controlling the timing and the size of the orders. In a VMI setting, the supplier takes over the responsibility of managing inventories at its customers and monitors their inventory levels and re-stocks product when necessary, and thus it is the supplier that controls the timing and the size of deliveries.
VMI offers various benefits to the supplier and its customers. In a VMI setting, the supplier has access to point of sale data as well as inventory levels at the customer locations. With this information, the supplier can better schedule its production and distribution and plan deliveries more accurately so as to minimize stock-outs at customer locations. Furthermore, reduced distortion of demand data results in decreased inventory levels along the supply chain and reduced inventory holding costs for both the supplier and its customers. Also, because of the increased flexibility in considerably less to serve customer A or B compared to customer C due to the geographical synergy between A and B. were served by themselves suggests that the cost allocations should be equal.
Now consider modifying the original example slightly and changing the location of customer C as in Figure 1 (c) . Suppose that at most two customers can be served together by a single truck because of consumption rates and planning period interactions. In this case, any two customers can be served together on a delivery route in a cost efficient way. However, grouping two customer together and allocating the cost of the joint delivery route to these customers and allocating twice this amount to the third customer may not be a rational cost allocation, as all three customers are identical in every single aspect.
The above examples illustrate that it is not trivial to allocate the distribution costs among the customers. Furthermore, the examples demonstrate that not only the synergies among the customers along a delivery route (intra-route synergies) but also the synergies among the customers on different delivery routes (inter-route synergies) are important in determining the cost-to-serve values of the customers.
In this paper, we design, implement, and analyze several cost allocation methods, from simple proportional rules to involved linear programming schemes. We illustrate the characteristics of the cost allocation methods on a variety of examples and we conduct an extensive computational study to assess their performance on randomly generated and real-life instances. We find that the linear programming based schemes are computationally efficient and exhibit robust performance across instances with varying characteristics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related literature and briefly discuss properties of well studied cost allocation methods from cooperative game theory. In Section 3, we first give a formal statement of the IRP and then discuss models that allow us to compute lower and upper bounds on the objective value of the IRP as well as an approximation of the objective value of the IRP. In Section 4, we introduce the inventory routing game (IRG) and develop several cost allocation methods, some of which are based on the models covered in 3. We illustrate these cost allocation methods on a number of examples. In Section 5, we demonstrate how our methods perform on randomly generated and real-world instances. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
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Literature Review
In this section, we review related literature, which can be categorized into two streams: literature on inventory routing problem and cooperative game theory.
There exists a large body of literature on inventory routing problems. We refer the reader to surveys Campbell et al. (1998) , Cordeau et al. (2007) and Bertazzi et al. (2008) for solution approaches for various inventory routing problems. We discuss the work by Song and Savelsbergh (2007) briefly, since it will be referred to later in the paper. The authors develop a methodology based on first generating feasible delivery routes or patterns and then use a linear programming problem to select good patterns to obtain a lower bound on the total transportation cost needed to satisfy customer demand over the planning horizon. They prove that it is sufficient to generate only a subset of the patterns to find the optimal solution to the pattern selection linear program and this reduces the computational time considerably.
Another stream of literature that is relevant to our work is on cooperative game theory. General references on cooperative game theory are Young (1985) , for a thorough review of basic cost allocation methods, and Borm et al. (2001) , for a survey of cooperative games associated with operations research problems. Cooperative game theory studies the class of games in which selfish players form collaborations to obtain greater benefits. The VMI cost allocation problem we consider in this paper is a cooperative game. In a cooperative game a common cost (or equivalently benefit) must be allocated among the participating players. Let the set N = {1, . . . , n} represent the set of players. Every S ⊂ N is called a coalition of players, whereas N is called the grand coalition.
Every cooperative game has an associated characteristic function, c(.) and the cost incurred by a coalition S is represented by c(S). The total cost to be allocated among the players is represented by c(N ). Even though, the customers do not form coalitions in our VMI setting, developing a fair mechanism to compute cost-to-serve for each customer corresponds to developing a cost allocation method for the inventory routing game (IRG). In this inventory routing game (a formal definition will be presented in Section 4), the customers represent the players and the optimal objective function value of the IRP is the characteristic function value of the game.
Next, we briefly summarize the concepts we will use from cooperative game theory literature.
In a budget balanced cost allocation, the total cost allocated to the participating players is equal to the total cost incurred by the grand coalition, c(N ). In a stable cost allocation, the total cost allocated to a subset of players should be less than or equal to the total cost incurred by that subset, c(S). The set of cost allocations that are budget balanced and stable is called the core of a Cost allocation in routing and distribution problems has rarely been addressed in the literature.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previously published work on allocating cost of a inventory routing problem. However, there exists closely related studies on the Traveling Salesman (TSG) and Vehicle Routing (VRG) games. The TSG considers the problem of allocating the cost of a round trip among the cities visited. Depending on the game, there may exist a home city which is not included in the set of players. Tamir (1989) considers a TSG with a home city and proves that under symmetric cost structure TSG always has a non-empty core when the number of players are less than or equal to four. Kuipers (1993) extends this result to TSG with five players. Note that the core may be empty when the number of players are greater than or equal to six. Potters et al. (1992) discuss TSG and its variant with fixed routes. For the fixed route TSG where for all coalitions the cities are visited in the same order, they prove that the game has a non-empty core if the fixed route solution is the optimal solution to the original TSP and the cost matrix satisfies the triangle inequality. They also introduce a class of matrices that generates TSG with non-empty cores. Engevall et al. (1998) consider the cost allocation problem of a distribution system of a gas and oil company where the total cost of a tour is to be allocated among the customers that are visited. Besides the well-known concepts from cooperative game theory, such as the nucleolus and the Shapley value, they introduce "demand nucleolus", which is similar to the nucleolus except that the excess of a coalition is modified by being multiplied by the demand of that coalition. By doing this, they aim to reduce the importance of coalitions that have relatively larger demands in computing the nucleolus. Faigle et al. (1998) also consider the problem of allocating the cost of an optimal traveling salesman tour in a fair way with a cost matrix satisfying triangular inequality and present examples with empty core even with Euclidean distances. By using the optimal value of the Held-Karp relaxation of the TSP, they claim to obtain cost allocations from moat packings in polynomial time using LP duality, guaranteeing that no coalition pays more than 4 3 times its stand alone cost. The VRG considers the problem of allocating the cost of optimal vehicle routes among the customers served. Gothe-Lundgren et al. (1996) consider the VRG with a homogenous fleet and present conditions when the core of a VRG is non-empty. Then, they use a constraint generation approach to compute the nucleolus of a VRG with a non-empty core. Engevall et al. (2004) extend this result to a VRG with heterogeneous vehicles and with some simplifications they determine whether the core is empty or not in a heterogeneous vehicles setting. They finally use the constraint generation approach to compute the nucleolus when the core is non-empty. There is a close relationship between the core and linear programming duality and a substantial amount of literature exists on using the dual of a problem to find or approximate the cost allocations in the core. Pal and Tardos (2003) convert a primal-dual algorithm into a group strategyproof cost-sharing mechanism and develop approximate budget balanced cost allocation methods for two NP-complete problems: metric facility location and single source rent-or-buy network design. Pal and Tardos (2003) also mention that for covering games, the core is non-empty if and only if the linear relaxation of the game-defining IP has no integrality gap. Goemans and Skutella (2004) establish a similar relationship between the existence of the core and LP duality for several variants of the facility location problem. They show that a core cost allocation exists if and only if the integrality gap is zero for a corresponding linear programming relaxation.
Cost allocation methods studied in the literature for related problems, such as TSG and VRG, do not have to deal with the time or inventory components of the problem and hence cannot be applied directly to IRG. In this study, we develop cost allocation methods that have low computational times and are effective in terms of game theoretical and practical aspects.
Inventory Routing Problem
In this section, we first formally define the inventory routing problem (IRP) and list our assumptions. Next, we discuss models that allow us to compute lower and upper bounds on the objective value of the IRP as well as an approximation of the objective value of the IRP.
Problem Definition
We consider a set of customers N = {1, . . . , n} that receive a single product from a single facility (depot). The IRP is defined on graph G, with vertex set V = {0, 1, . . . , n} where 0 represents the depot, and edge set E = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ V }. The cost of traveling along an edge (i, j) is denoted by c ij and these cost figures are assumed to satisfy the triangle inequality. The supplier has an infinite supply and is responsible for delivering to customers over a given planning horizon of length T .
We assume that all the events occur at discrete time intervals t = 1, ..., T . Customer i has a finite storage capacity C i and consumes the product at a deterministic and stationary consumption rate of q i per period. The initial inventory of customer i is denoted by I i0 . The supplier serves customers by executing a set of delivery routes that start and end at the depot. Each route is assigned one vehicle from an infinite number of homogenous vehicles with capacity Q. A feasible delivery route corresponds to an ordered list of customers and the quantity of product delivered to each customer on the list such that the total volume delivered does not exceed the vehicle capacity. The cost of a delivery route is the total travel cost of the vehicle. Then the IRP seeks to identify a set of minimum cost delivery routes over a given planning horizon such that no stock-outs occurs and the storage capacity at each customer location is not exceeded. In other words the supplier has to choose his distribution strategy over a planning period by specifying which routes to execute and how much to deliver to each customer on a given route and when these routes depart from the facility.
Next, we summarize the rest of our assumptions. First, we assume that all the routes to be executed during a period are performed at the beginning of the period and completed instantly.
The consumption at each customer is realized after the deliveries are made at the beginning of each period. The cost of executing a route only depends on the travel costs on the arcs, c ij 's, and does not depend on the amount of product transported or delivered. No shortages at the customer locations are allowed. Storage capacities at customer locations affect the feasibility of a distribution strategy, however, since we assume that the supplier incurs all the inventory holding costs, we ignore these costs in formulating the IRP.
Linear Programming Approximations for the IRP
To derive cost-to-serve information, we consider the inventory routing cost allocation problem as a cooperative game. Every cooperative game has a characteristic function that assigns a cost to each coalition. In the inventory routing game, to be defined formally in Section 4, the characteristic function represents the cost of serving a coalition, i.e., the cost of an optimal solution to the instance of the IRP defined by the customers in the coalition. Since solving the IRP is challenging and time-consuming even for small instances and there are an exponential number of coalitions,
we have chosen to work with approximations of the cost to serve a coalition. More precisely, we use the value of the linear programming (LP) relaxation of a formulation that approximates the underlying inventory routing problem. In this section, we present these formulations.
A Pattern Selection Model
The first formulation we consider is due to Song and Savelsbergh (2007) who propose a method for computing a lower bound on the optimal objective function value of the IRP. 
denote the set of the customers with a positive delivery quantity in pattern P j . The cost θ(P j ) of delivery pattern P j is the optimal cost of the a TSP on δ(P j ). Let P be the set of all feasible delivery patterns. Let x j be a variable denoting how many times pattern P j is used and let U i be the total consumption of customer i during the planning period. The pattern selection LP below provides a lower bound on the average transportation cost over the planning horizon T :
The objective function (1) expresses the minimization of the average transportation cost over the planning horizon. Constraints (2) guarantee that each customer i is delivered at least its total demand over the planning horizon.
A Set Partitioning Model
Next, we present a method for computing an upper bound on the the optimal objective function value of the IRP.
Observe that establishing the feasibility of a distribution plan is difficult because of the interaction between the timing of deliveries and the available storage capacity. The quantity delivered to a customer is bounded from above by the minimum of the truck capacity and the remaining storage capacity at the customer location. This is a complex constraint because "the remaining storage capacity at the customer location" is history-dependent. However, if we make the simplifying assumption that each customer is always visited on the same delivery route, then the history-dependence can easily be handled.
Given a delivery route p, and thus the set of customers served using this delivery route, it is easy to determine the frequency f req p with which the route has to be performed and the quantity d ip that needs to be delivered to customer i served on the route. The route has to be performed at least every
periods to ensure that customer i does not run out of product and the route has to be performed at least
periods to ensure that the vehicle can deliver enough product for all the customers. Thus we have
} and the associated delivery
. The cost θ(p) of delivery route p is the optimal cost of the TSP on δ(p).
Let P be the set of all feasible delivery routes and let x p be a binary variable denoting whether delivery route p is used or not. Let a ip be an indicator equal to 1 if customer i is served on delivery route p and 0 otherwise. Then, the set partitioning problem below provides an upper bound on
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Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!) the average transportation cost over the planning horizon and also identifies a feasible distribution strategy for the supplier in which each customer is served using exactly one delivery route:
The objective function (3) minimizes the average transportation cost. Note that, this model averages the costs over an infinite horizon. The reason for this is to obtain a repeatable distribution strategy and to avoid the complications resulting from the residual period's demands. Constraints (4) guarantee that every customer is visited by exactly one route.
A Set Covering Model
Finally, we present a method that is inspired by both the pattern selection model and the set partitioning model. Although the method generates neither a lower bound nor an upper bound on the optimal objective function of the IRP, it may provide a better approximation of this value.
Recall that establishing the feasibility of a distribution plan is difficult because of the interaction between the timing of deliveries and the available storage capacities. If we ignore the timing of deliveries, then we can compute an upper bound on the quantity that can be delivered at a customer on a delivery route simply by taking the minimum of the vehicle capacity and the storage capacity at the customer. Of course, a distribution plan that ignores delivery time considerations is not necessarily feasible.
Let a delivery route p specify delivery quantities d ip for the customers that are served by the pattern, where the delivery quantity d ip for a customer is an integer multiple of that customer's consumption rate q i . Of course, a feasible delivery route p has to have
Furthermore, we set the frequency f req p of delivery route p through
}. The cost θ(p) of delivery route p is the optimal cost of the TSP on δ(p).
Let P be the set of feasible delivery routes, let x p be an integer variable denoting the number of times route p is used, and let
. The set covering model is given by:
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The objective function (5) minimizes the average transportation cost. Note that, as for SPM the costs are averaged over an infinite horizon. Constraints (6) guarantee that the consumption of each customer is satisfied.
SCM does not provide an upper bound since its solution may result in deliveries that exceed customer storage capacities. SCM does not provide a lower bound either since it only allows a delivery quantity that is an integer multiple of the customer's per period consumption rate. However, SCM does not assume that each customer is visited by only one route. Thus, the optimal solution is likely to be a better approximation of the optimal distribution strategy than the solution of SPM.
It may also be preferable to the pattern selection model in the sense that this method will yield a distribution plan, whereas the pattern selection LP model provides only a lower bound value.
Next, we discuss the practicality of the models presented above. First, all models require the generation of patterns and depending on the model a pattern may specify a set of customers or it may specify a set of customers and a delivery quantity for each of these customers. The number of feasible patterns may be quite large for all the models and determining the cost of a pattern requires the solution of a TSP.
In order to use these models for real-life instances, we rely on the fact that for our partner company a delivery route never visits more than four customers and even that only rarely. This not only significantly reduces the number of feasible delivery routes, it also simplifies determining the cost of the routes. Furthermore, it is possible to derive dominance relations that further reduces the number of delivery routes that needs to be considered.
Next, we develop a relationship between the optimal objective function values of the models. Let 
PROOF See the appendix.
Since we know that z *
Cost-to-Serve and the Inventory Routing Game
In this section, we first define the cooperative game associated with the inventory routing problem, which we refer to as the inventory routing game. Next, we propose methods to determine a costto-serve for the customers. That is, we develop cost allocation methods for the cooperative game.
We discuss the pros and cons of these allocation methods, in terms of practicality and theoretical properties. We also present examples to illustrate the behavior of the proposed methods. 
Game Definition
We define the inventory routing game (IRG) as a cooperative game where the supplier has to serve the n customers that are the players in the game. The set of all customers N is the grand coalition of the game and any subset of customers S ⊂ N makes up a coalition. The characteristic function c(S) is the optimal average transportation cost of the IRP with a given set of customers S over the planning horizon. By defining the characteristic function in this manner, we implicity assume that there exist a sufficient number of trucks to serve any subset of the customers. The cost allocations for the IRG represent the cost-to-serve values for the customers.
We first prove that the IRG may have an empty core. That is, a budget balanced and stable cost allocation method may not always exist.
Lemma 2. The core of the inventory routing game may be empty. PROOF This follows directly from a similar result for the Traveling Salesman Game (TSG).
The TSG easily reduces to an IRG with infinite vehicle and storage (at the customer locations) capacities if the cost matrix satisfies the triangle inequality.
As stated before, the IRG is similar to the TSG and VRG in the sense that in all three cooperative games the goal is to allocate the total transportation cost of the grand coalition among the customers. Also, in all three games computing the characteristic function value for a given coalition requires the solution of an NP-Hard problem.
However, the IRG is also quite different from the TSG and VRG. Most importantly, due to the fact that it is a multi-period problem and the fact that delivery quantities have to be decided, there exist an infinite number of feasible distribution plans so that computing the characteristic function value is challenging even for very small instances of the game.
We propose several cost allocation mechanisms for the IRG. We classify the proposed mechanisms into three categories: proportional, per-route based and duality based cost allocation methods. In general proportional cost allocation methods are easy to compute but are not stable (fair) due to the fact that they do not take into account the effect of the interactions (or synergies) among the customers. Due to their simplicity, they are the most commonly used cost allocation methods in practice. On the other hand the other two methods consider the effect of customer synergies in some form and hence are harder to compute but provide more accurate cost-to-serve values.
One of the primary performance indicators of a cost allocation method is whether it is stable or not. If a cost allocation is stable than the allocated cost to a subset of customers cannot be greater than the stand-alone cost of that subset. However, stability is also a restrictive condition and for most practical problems stable and budget balanced allocations do not exist. If the stability condition is not satisfied, then one can compute the percentage of any positive deviation of the allocated cost of a subset from its stand-alone cost. We call this percentage the instability value of a subset or coalition. Then, the instability value of a cost allocation method, is the maximum instability value over all the coalitions. Cost allocation methods that result in small instability values are preferred over cost allocation methods that result in large instability values.
A Proportional Cost Allocation Method
In this subsection, we present a proportional cost allocation method. This method provides a quick cost allocation that takes into account some important factors, such as a customer's distance to the depot, storage capacity, and consumption rate, but ignores other factors such as synergies among the customers. The method does not require computing (or approximating) the characteristic function of the game. The cost allocation method in use by our industry partner is of this type.
For the IRG, the factors that impact a customer's cost-to-serve are the distance to the depot, the distance to other customers, the storage capacity, and the consumption rate. Of these, the distance to the depot is probably the most relevant factor, as the cost to be allocated among the customers is the total travel cost and so the cost-to-serve of a customer should be positively correlated with a customer's distance to the depot. Storage capacity and consumption rate are also significant, since a customer's consumption triggers a delivery in every
periods. The cost allocated to a customer should be negatively correlated to this delivery frequency. The distance to other customers reflects, in a way, the geographical synergies between the customers. However, the distance to other customers is not enough to capture synergies accurately. Synergies among customers also depend on the interactions among other factors, such as storage capacities, consumption rates, and the vehicle capacity. Therefore, the distance to other customers is not considered in the proportional cost allocation method.
We compute α i , the cost allocated to customer i, using the following two-step procedure:
PCAM:
Step 1
This procedure produces a budget balanced cost allocation given an optimal cost c(N ) for the IRP in a fraction of a second even for large instances of the problem. Note that the cost of serving customer i individually is 2β i . Therefore, this allocation method allocates the total cost proportional to the individual costs of the customers.
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A Per-route Based Cost Allocation Method
Next, we propose a cost allocation method, which allocates costs to the customers on a per-route basis. That is, the cost of each delivery route is allocated to the customers it serves without considering the interactions among delivery routes. This cost allocation method is expected to perform better than the proportional cost allocation method discussed above since the cost allocation will be based on the routes that actually compose the total cost and considers the intra-route synergies (synergies among the customers on a particular route).
Per-route based cost allocation methods are suitable for the IRG for several reasons. First, the cost of every route is allocated to the customers that trigger the execution of that route so they are responsible for that cost. Second, if the cost of each route is completely allocated among the customers it serves, then the resulting cost allocation will be a budget balance cost allocation.
Furthermore, per-route based cost allocations can be calculated fairly efficiently, especially when the delivery routes serve only a limited number of customers. For example, even if the number of delivery routes is large, but all of them have at most four customers, the computational effort required is small since allocating costs in a 4-player game can be done quickly.
Although any cost allocation method proposed for the TSG can be employed as a per-route based method for the IRG, we have chosen to use the one proposed in Faigle et al. (1998) , since it can easily be modified to handle delivery quantity information. Let N ∪ {0} be the set of cities of the TSP, where "0" denotes the starting location of the salesman. Let S be a subset of the cities,S be the complement of S, and let M be the set of all partitions {S,S}. We assume, without loss of generality, that 0 ∈S. Let w S,S be the width of the moat surrounding the customer set S and let g ij be the distance between cities i and j. The moat packing with maximum total width can be obtained by solving the linear program:
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It has been shown that there always exists a maximum moat packing with a nested structure (that is, no two moats intersect). Given a nested moat packing with maximum total width, the proposed cost allocation scheme distributes twice the width of any moat among the cities on the outside of the moat, i.e.,
(Observe that the width of the moats can be allocated in different ways, i.e., .) Faigle et al. (1998) show that in the resulting cost allocation no coalition pays more than its stand alone cost, which is equal to the optimal cost of the corresponding TSP. However, the total width of the maximum moat packing may be less than the length of the tour, hence the cost allocation may not be budget balanced. Although it is possible to simply scale up the allocated costs to achieve a budget balanced cost allocation, the resulting cost allocation may not be stable.
Even though M P has exponentially many variables, Faigle et al. (1998) show that the dual of M P can be solved in polynomial time. Unfortunately, it is not obvious to us how their proposed dual based procedure can guarantee that the resulting optimal moat packing has a nested structure.
Since we need a nested moat packing for cost allocation, we have developed a procedure to obtain a nested moat packing from a non-nested one (see the appendix). Our procedure is not polynomial and thus we believe that the question of whether a nested maximum moat-packing can be found in polynomial time remains open.
A Moat Packing Cost Allocation for the IRG
In order to devise a moat-packing based cost allocation method for the IRG from the above procedure, we modify the weights of the cities (customers) to reflect the delivery volumes. In a TSG, uniform weights are appropriate since the cities outside the moat are equally responsible for the vehicle to cross over that moat.
However, in the IRG context, the customers may have different levels of influence on the execution of a route, so they may not be equally responsible for the TSP tour serving them.
Let the ideal delivery volume to a customer be the minimum of the vehicle capacity and the storage capacity at the customer location (min{Q, C i }). As a general principle, the customer that receives an ideal delivery volume from a route should be allocated a higher cost than a customer that receives the residual amount in the vehicle, if both customers happen to be at the same location. Let r i be the ratio of the actual volume delivered to a customer location by the route and the ideal delivery volume. Then, we set the weights for the customers as follows:
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Using these modified weights in distributing the moat costs, we compute the cost allocated to each customer on a given delivery route. Note that this method considers each route individually, hence the weights for the customers are computed for every delivery route separately. The moat packing cost allocation method for the IRG is as follows:
MPCAM:
Step 1 From the solution of IRP, identify the optimal delivery routes. Let K be the set of optimal delivery routes. For each route k ∈ K, execute Step 2 through Step 5.
Step 2 For each customer i on route k, calculate r i (k).
Step 3 Solve the dual M P and determine an optimal nested moat packing and w(k) values using the procedure discussed above.
Step 4 Calculate the allocated cost of a customer along the route using the following formulas:
Step 5 If the total allocated cost to the customers is less than the cost of the route, scale up the cost allocation values to obtain a budget balanced cost allocation.
Step 6 After computing the allocated cost of each customer for every delivery route, compute the final cost allocation of customers α i by summing up the cost allocations from individual routes,
This per-route based cost allocation method will perform better in terms of stability compared to the proportional cost allocation method because within each route it considers the stability of the allocation. Therefore, such a cost allocation method works best if the inter-route synergies are minimal.
Although this per-route based cost allocation method has many advantages in terms of stability and computational efficiency (if given an optimal IRP solution), it also has some limitations.
First, this method requires not only the optimal cost of the IRP, but also the optimal delivery routes. Second, if instead of an optimal IRP solution a heuristic IRP solution is used, the scheme allocates the costs based on the delivery routes of the heuristic solution, and hence the quality of the allocation depends on the quality of the IRP solution used.
Duality Based Cost Allocation Methods
For several games based on combinatorial optimization problems, the relationship between its core and the dual of the LP-relaxation of an integer programming formulation of the problem is well established. Specifically for facility location, set partitioning, packing and covering games, it is proven that the absence of an integrality gap for the LP-relaxation of a specific formulation is a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core.
In Section 3, we have described models that yield a lower and upper bound on the optimal objective function value of the IRP, as well as a model that yields an approximation of the optimal objective function value of the IRP. Therefore, we consider the three different LP-relaxations and their duals for generating cost allocations: the pattern selection LP (P SLP ), the LP-relaxation of the set partitioning model (SP M − LP ), and the LP-relaxation of the set covering model
An important point in using the dual of the LP-relaxations of IRP approximations to obtain a cost allocation is that the total cost that can be recovered is bounded by the optimal objective function value of the LP-relaxation. If the total transportation cost of the optimal distribution strategy is greater (less) than the cost recovered by the cost allocation methods based on the dual problems, we then simply scale up (down) the cost allocations. In general, when we scale up (down) such cost allocations to get a budget balanced cost allocation for the IRG, we might compromise the stability of the allocation. Furthermore, it is possible that, for a particular IRG, the cost allocations from all the duality based methods are instable, whereas there exists a cost allocation in the core for the IRG.
However, duality based cost allocation methods have several advantages over the cost allocation methods discussed earlier. First, duality based methods do not require optimal delivery routes.
Furthermore, they have a system-wide perspective and take both intra-route and inter-route synergies into account, hence cost allocations from duality based method are more likely to perform better in terms of stability. Also, duality based cost allocation methods are not biased by delivery route information as the per-route allocation method and do not penalize a customer for being on a high cost delivery route. That is, suppose we have two identical customers at the same location and one of them is served by a cost efficient route and the other one is not. Since these customers are identical from every aspect, the duality based cost allocation methods will compute the same cost-to-serve value for both customers. On the other hand, any per-route based cost allocation method will treat them differently as these methods allocate costs on a per-route basis. Finally, duality based methods are computationally more efficient, since they only require to solve an LP and possibly perform a scaling up operation to obtain a budget balanced cost allocation.
Next, we present the dual LPs corresponding to each of the models introduced in Section 3.2 and show how to compute cost allocations for the IRG based on these dual LPs. 
Let z * DP SLP (N ) be the optimal objective function of the DP SLP and y * be the corresponding optimal solution. Let α i be the allocated cost to customer i ∈ N . The DP SLP based cost allocation method for the IRG is as follows:
DPSLP:
Step 1 Solve DP SLP and determine y * .
Step 2 Calculate the allocated costs of the customers using the following formula:
A Cost Allocation Method Based on Dual SPM-LP Next, for the SP M − LP ,
let y i be the dual variables associated with constraints (4) and let u p be the dual variables associated with constraints (5), then the dual of the LP-relaxation of SPM is as follows: 
DSCM-LP:
Step 1 Solve DSCM − LP and determine y * .
Illustrative Examples
In this subsection, we illustrate some of the characteristics of the methods we proposed for the IRG on small instances. The examples show the limitations of the proportional and per-route based cost allocation models compared to the duality based ones.
In the first example, there are three customers A, B and C. The location of these customers as well as the parameters of the instance are presented in Figure 2 . The optimal delivery routes for this instance serve customer A and B together and customer C alone. As can be seen from Figure   2 , there exist only intra-route synergies between customers A and B.
The columns of Table 1 Note that all allocations except for the PRO realize the positive intra-route synergy among customers A and B and allocate a smaller cost to these than to customer C and are stable.
In the second example, presented in Figure 3 , there are three customers, A, B and C, which are identical in every sense. Hence, the desired cost allocation should allocate the same cost to all 
Figure 2
An instance with an empty core. three customers. The optimal distribution strategy is to visit any two customers together, and the other customer alone every period. Also, note that this example is an instance with an empty core.
From Table 2 , we observe that the proportional cost allocation method and the duality based cost allocation methods treat the three customers equally as expected. However, the cost allocation of the per-route based method M OAT depends on the distribution strategy used over the planning horizon. For example, if the same two customers are visited together every period then their cost allocations will be 1.866 and the cost allocation of the third customer will be 2. If we alternate the customers visited together every period, then the cost allocated to all three customers will be 1.911. This is a disadvantage of the per-route based cost allocation method, since it is based on the delivery routes used rather than the actual dynamics of the instance. 
Figure 3
An instance with an empty core. The third example, Figure 4 , is an empty core instance with a single route optimal distribution strategy. Therefore, any cost allocation will have some instability, hence our objective is to find the one with the lowest instability. There exist both intra-route and inter-route synergies between customers, hence we expect that the duality based methods to perform better than the proportional and per-route based methods. For example, customer A should be allocated a lower cost compared to B and C due to its synergies with both B and C.
As can be seen from Table 3 , the proportional and the per-route based cost allocations are unable to asses the advantage of customer A, and treat the three customers equally. On the other hand, the duality based cost allocation methods are able to differentiate the customers and allocate the cost accordingly. The cost allocation method that works best on this instance is DSP M − LP since it provides a cost allocation with the lowest instability value (2.75%). 
Figure 4
An empty core instance with a single route optimal solution. The fourth example, Figure 5 , is a non-empty core instance with a single route optimal distribution strategy. This example shows that even though there is only one route in the optimal solution, the per-route cost allocation can still perform quite unsatisfactorily. In this example, customer A will receive a low cost if it is served alone, however by the per-route based cost allocation it is assigned a cost more than five times its stand alone cost. By changing the values of the parameters, we can increase this instability value to infinity, which proves that the per-route based cost allocations that do not consider inter-route synergies may not work well even on instances with single route optimal solutions. 
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Figure 5 Another non-empty core instance with single route optimal solution. The fifth example, Figure 6 is an empty core instance where there are 11 identical customers at the same location and a vehicle is able to serve only 10 customers. This is an extreme case example in the sense that any cost allocation can be made arbitrarily instable as the number of customers grove. The total transportation cost per period is 4 and since all customers are identical they should be all allocated
. Therefore, the total cost allocated to any coalition with 10 customers is 40 11
and is greater than the stand alone cost of the coalition, which is equal to 2. The instability value of the cost allocation approximates to 100% as the number of customers goes to infinity.
From these results, we observe that the proportional and per-route based cost allocations have some limitations depending on the instance characteristics, especially when the synergies between customers are high. Duality based cost allocation methods perform quite satisfactory in all examples presented above, if the structure of the problem permits the existence of a stable cost allocation. An empty core instance with 100% instability.
Computational Study
We have carried out a computational study on random and real-world instances to evaluate the average performance of the methods we have discussed in terms of computational efficiency and the stability of the allocations they generate. We generate, over a 1,000 × 1,000 square, 50 different random instance with 25 and 50 customers. We set the truck capacity to 1000 in all instances. We generated two types of customers with high or low storage capacities. The ratio Similarly, the ratio of the consumption rate to the storage capacity is either within [0.5, 0.75] or [1.25, 1.5] specifying that the customer has a relatively low or high consumption rate. As some of our proposed methods such as SP M or SCM require that the consumption rate of the customers to be less than both the truck capacity and the storage capacity, we allow multiple deliveries in a period to satisfy this assumption. That is, we divide a period into subperiods until the consumption rate of all the customers in a subperiod are less than both the truck capacity and the storage capacities. The planning horizon in all the instances is 100 periods and each period may include several subperiods depending on the parameters.
We also generate clusters to represent dense regions with many supply or demand points such as metropolitan areas. Clusters are uniformly distributed in the square and each point in a cluster is generated by using a standard Normal distribution. Remaining points are distributed uniformly across the map. In the instances with 25 customers, there are 3 clusters and in the instances with 50 customers, there are 4 clusters and in both cases 45% of the customer locations fall within the clusters.
We test the performance of the proposed cost allocation methods with respect to both solution quality and computational time. The solution quality refers to the maximum percentage instability of a cost allocation method. However, calculating this value is computationally challenging. To calculate the exact percentage instability of a cost allocation method, we first need to calculate We believe that, it is reasonable to assume that in practical settings due to limited rationality and information sharing of the customers it is unlikely for larger sub-coalitions to form.
Since For the characteristic function values of the coalitions we use the upper bound value, z * SP M (S). However, note that using this value will underestimate the maximum percentage instability value as well as the number of instable subsets. Also using z * SP M (S) will favor the cost allocation method based on DSP M compared to the other methods.
The per-route based cost allocation method requires the delivery routes to allocate the costs among the customers. Because we cannot solve the IRP to optimality, we use the selected routes (patterns) of the P SLP method as an input for the M OAT cost allocation method. The drawback of using these routes is that the M OAT will yield a biased cost allocation that is similar to the cost allocation of DP SLP method. Table 5 summarizes the results of the experiments in which we use z * LP −SCM (N ) as an approximation to the optimal total cost of the IRP. The columns represent the cost allocation methods as before. The first four rows summarize the performance of the methods on the instances with 25 customers. The first row presents the average number of instable subsets (up to size 4) with each cost allocation method. The row "AVE" presents the average of the average percent instability of cost allocation methods over all the subsets whereas the next row "MAX" presents the average of the maximum percent instability of cost allocation methods over all the subsets. The next row, "MAX MAX" shows the maximum of the maximum percent instability of cost allocation methods over all the subsets and instances. The next four rows present the same performance indices for the instances with 50 customers. Similarly, Table 6 summarizes the performance of the cost allocation methods when we use z * SP M (N ) as an approximation to the optimal total cost of the IRP. Our computational experiments show that duality-based cost allocation methods DSP M − LP and DSCM − LP perform significantly better than the other cost allocation methods. Even their maximum of the maximum percentage instability values is less than 6%. As expected the proportional cost allocation method has a high number of instable subsets and extremely high maximum instability values. The average of maximum percentage instability value is around 35% and the maximum of this value is more than 50%. As mentioned before, per-route based cost allocation method, M OAT , mimics DP SLP since it uses the solution of the latter method as an input.
Both methods perform better compared to the proportional cost allocation method, however, are significantly outperformed by DSP M − LP and DSCM − LP . Table 7 summarizes the computational times of the proposed cost allocation methods. The computational times of the proportional and per-route based cost allocation methods are negligible and hence are not presented in Table 7 . As can be seen from Table 7 , the proposed cost allocation methods complete within seconds. Hence we conclude that our methods are not only effective but also computationally efficient.
In the computational study we have carried out with real-life instances, we compare the performance of the DSP M − LP to a simplified version of the proportional cost allocation method that is used by our partner industrial gas company. Their model, which we will denote with M M , first calculates a "mileage cost" for each customer and then multiplies this mileage cost with the -ratio (SC/U R-ratio) and use them as rough indicators for cost-to-serve. The intuition is that with many customers in close proximity there is a higher chance for synergies and thus a low cost-to-serve, and with a high SC/U R-ratio there will be infrequent visit that can be planned properly and thus a cost-to-serve.
For the first instance, shown in Figure 7 , the average SC/U R-ratio over all customers is 532. Although its location is somewhat isolated, it has a moderate SC/U R-ratio of 297. From the detailed analysis of the instances, we conclude that DSP M − LP is a superior cost allocation method compared to M M . It is much better able to identify customers that are easy or challenging from a distribution planning perspective and to allocate costs accordingly.
Conclusion
In a vendor managed inventory setting, assessing the cost-to-serve of customers is of value when setting prices, targeting prospective customers, prioritizing deliveries, or revisiting routing/quantity decisions. We propose several cost allocation methods to determine the cost-to-serve for customers.
We show empirically that our proposed methods perform significantly better than the proportional allocation schemes typically used in practice as these schemes ignore the synergies among customers. The proposed methods are computational efficient and can be used produce cost allocations in real-life environments. 
Appendix. Proof of Lemma 1
We first prove that z * P SLP (N ) ≤ z * SCM (N ). Note that every feasible pattern for the model SCM is also a feasible pattern for the model P SLP . Also, the parameter b ip of model SCM is equal to 
Appendix. Procedure for Finding a Nested Moat Packing
Suppose that we solve the dual M P and obtain a maximum moat packing vector w for the TSP that does not have a nested structure. This means that there are at least two moats that intersect.
Let the width of the moat surrounding a subset S of customers be denoted by w S in this discussion.
Let S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 be three disjoint partitions of the set N ∪{0} and let w S 1 ∪S 3 > 0 and w S 2 ∪S 3 > 0 be the two moats that intersect and let = min{w S 1 ∪S 3 , w S 2 ∪S 3 }. The procedure updates the width of the moats and obtains another moat packing vectorw such that w S 1 = w S 1 + ,w S 2 = w S 2 + ,w S 1 ∪S 3 = w S 1 ∪S 3 − ,w S 2 ∪S 3 = w S 2 ∪S 3 − ,w = w ∀ others.
We claim thatw is a feasible optimal solution for linear program M P . The proof of optimality is straight forward. The vector w is a maximum moat packing vector and we increase the width of two moats (w S 1 , w S 2 ) and decrease the width of two moats (w S 1 ∪S 3 , w S 2 ∪S 3 ), hence the vectorw is also a maximum moat packing vector. The constraints of linear program M P is not violated by
